Internet-Draft CoRIM-SEV October 2024
Glaze Expires 10 April 2025 [Page]
Workgroup:
Remote ATtestation ProcedureS
Internet-Draft:
draft-deeglaze-amd-sev-snp-corim-profile-01
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Author:
D. Glaze
Google LLC

CoRIM profile for AMD SEV-SNP attestation report

Abstract

AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization with Secure Nested Pages (SEV-SNP) attestation reports comprise of reference values and cryptographic key material that a Verifier needs in order to appraise Attestation Evidence produced by an AMD SEV-SNP virtual machine. This document specifies the information elements for representing SEV-SNP Reference Values in CoRIM format.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/deeglaze/draft-deeglaze-amd-sev-snp-corim-profile.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 April 2025.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This profile describes the extensions and restrictions placed on Reference Values, Endorsements, and Evidence that support the attestation capabilities of AMD products that provide Securet Encrypted Virtualization with Secure Nested Pages (SEV-SNP).

CoRIM ([I-D.ietf-rats-corim]) defines a baseline CDDL for Reference Values and Endorsements that this profile extends. Some measurement types of the baseline CDDL are not used in this profile. The AMD SEV-SNP attestation report byte format is specified by AMD. The profile defines a transformation from the AMD byte format into a CoMID representation for use in appraisal.

This profile is meant for expressing reference values and endorsements of specific environments. It is not meant to encode complex policy decisions about the acceptability of measurements. The accepted claim set construction (ACS) this profile enables does lay a foundation for policy engines that enable further evaluation over complete ACS constructions.

This profile extends the flags-map to represent the guest policy and host platform info that are unique to AMD SEV-SNP. The profile extends the $crypto-key-type-choice to represent the SHA-384 digest of a key in AMD format from Appendix: Digital Signatures of [SEV-SNP.API].

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-corim] and Section 4 of [RFC9334]. The syntax of data descriptions is CDDL as specified in [RFC8610]. Fields of the AMD SEV-SNP ATTESTATION_REPORT are referred to by their assigned names in [SEV-SNP.API].

3. AMD SEV-SNP Attestation Reports

The AMD SEV-SNP attestation scheme in [SEV-SNP.API] contains measurements of security-relevant configuration of the host environment and the launch configuration of a SEV-SNP VM. This draft documents the normative representation of attestation report Evidence as a CoRIM profile.

AMD-SP: AMD Secure Processor. A separate core that provides the confidentiality and integrity properties of AMD SEV-SNP. The function that is relevant to this document is its construction of signed virtual machine attestation reports.

[VCEK]: Versioned Chip Endorsement Key. A key for signing the SEV-SNP Attestation Report. The key is derived from a unique device secret as well as the security patch levels of relevant host components.

[VLEK]: Version Loaded Endorsement Key. An alternative SEV-SNP Attestation Report signing key that is derived from a secret shared between AMD and a Cloud Service Provider. The key is encrypted with a per-device per-version wrapping key that is then decrypted and stored by the AMD-SP.

VEK: Either a VCEK or VLEK.

3.1. AMD SEV-SNP CoRIM Profile

AMD SEV-SNP launch endorsements are carried in one or more CoMIDs inside a CoRIM.

The profile attribute in the CoRIM MUST be present and MUST have a single entry set to the URI http://amd.com/please-permalink-me as shown in Figure 1.

/ corim-map / {
  / corim.profile / 3: [
    32("http://amd.com/please-permalink-me")
  ]
  / ... /
}
Figure 1: SEV-SNP attestation profile version 1, CoRIM profile

3.1.1. AMD SEV-SNP Target Environment

The ATTESTATION_REPORT structure as understood in the RATS Architecture [RFC9334] is a signed collection of Claims that constitute Evidence about the Target Environment. The Attester for the ATTESTATION_REPORT is specialized hardware that will only run AMD-signed firmware.

The instance identifier can be argued as any of REPORT_ID, REPORT_ID_MA when non-zero, CHIP_ID (for VCEK), or CSP_ID (for VLEK). Given that REPORT_ID and REPORT_ID_MA are more ephemeral measured values and not the instance of the AMD-SP as the attesting environment, they are relegated to measurements. Any endorsement of VM instances specific to either the REPORT_ID or REPORT_ID_MA values SHOULD use a conditional endorsement triple.

The different notions of identity induce different classes of attestation to identify target environments. The different classes of attestation are

  • By chip: The environment-map / instance is 560(CHIP_ID).

  • By CSP: The environment-map / instance is 560(CSP_ID).

The class-id for the Target Environment measured by the AMD-SP is a tagged UUID that corresponds to the attestation class:

  • By chip: d05e6d1b-9f46-4ae2-a610-ce3e6ee7e153

  • By CSP: 89a7a1f0-e704-4faa-acbd-81c86df8a961

TODO: AMD to assign OIDs for the above classes, e.g., #6.111(1.3.6.1.4.1.3704.2.1) and #6.111(1.3.6.1.4.1.3704.2.2). The rest of the class-map MUST remain empty, since class is compared for deterministic CBOR binary encoding equality.

The group is free for a CoRIM issuer to assign.

If the SIGNING_KEY bit of the attestation report is 1 indicating VLEK use, then the class-id MUST NOT be by chip.

/ environment-map / {
  / class-map / {
    / class-id: / 0 => #6.111(1.3.6.1.4.1.3704.2.1)
  }
  / instance: / 1 => #6.560(REPORT_ID)
}

3.1.2. AMD SEV-SNP Attestation Report measurements

The fields of an attestation report are named by mkey numbers that map to appropriate measurement-values-map values. This profile defines no new measurement-values-map extensions for the $$measurement-values-map-extensions socket. The only extensions are to $$flags-map-extensions.

The VMPL field is a raw 0..3 value, so this profile extends the raw value type choice of the CoRIM base CDDL:

$raw-value-type-choice /= uint
3.1.2.1. AMD SEV-SNP flags-map extensions

The POLICY field and the PLATFORM_INFO field of the attestation report contain flags distinguished from the base CoRIM CDDL.

The POLICY boolean flags are added as extensions to $$flags-map-extension, starting from codepoint -1.

$$flags-map-extension //= &(
  sevsnpvm-policy-smt-allowed: -1,
  sevsnpvm-policy-migration-agent-allowed: -2,
  sevsnpvm-policy-debug-allowed: -3,
  sevsnpvm-policy-single-socket-only: -4,
  sevsnpvm-policy-cxl-allowed: -5,
  sevsnpvm-policy-mem-aes-256-xts-required: -6,
  sevsnpvm-policy-rapl-must-be-disabled: -7,
  sevsnpvm-policy-ciphertext-hiding-must-be-enabled: -8,
  sevsnpvm-policy-reserved: -47..-9,
)

The sevsnpvm-policy- flag extensions correspond to the ATTESTATION_REPORT POLICY bit positions with the following correspondence:

  • sevsnpvm-policy-smt-allowed refers to bit 16 of POLICY.

  • sevsnpvm-policy-migration-agent-allowed refers to bit 18 of POLICY.

  • sevsnpvm-policy-debug-allowed refers to bit 19 of POLICY.

  • sevsnpvm-policy-single-socket-only refers to bit 20 of POLICY.

  • sevsnpvm-policy-cxl-allowed refers to bit 21 of POLICY.

  • sevsnpvm-policy-mem-aes-256-xts-required refers to bit 22 of POLICY.

  • sevsnpvm-policy-rapl-must-be-disabled refers to bit 23 of POLICY.

  • sevsnpvm-policy-ciphertext-hiding-must-be-enabled refers to bit 24 of POLICY.

  • Bit position b greater than 24 of POLICY corresponds to extension 16-b.

There are 47 available bits for selection when the mandatory 1 in position 17 and the ABI Major.Minor values are excluded from the 64-bit POLICY. The PLATFORM_INFO bits are host configuration that are added as extensions to $$flags-map-extension starting at -49.

$$flags-map-extension //= &(
  sevsnphost-smt-enabled: -49,
  sevsnphost-tsme-enabled: -50,
  sevsnphost-ecc-mem-reported-enabled:-51,
  sevsnphost-rapl-disabled: -52,
  sevsnphost-ciphertext-hiding-enabled: -53
  sevsnphost-reserved: -112..-49
)

The sevsnphost- flag extensions correspond to ATTESTATION_REPORT PLATFORM_INFO bit positions with the following correspondence:

  • sevsnphost-smt-enabled refers to bit 0 of PLATFORM_INFO.

  • sevsnphost-tsme-enabled refers to bit 1 of PLATFORM_INFO.

  • sevsnphost-ecc-mem-reported-enabled refers to bit 2 of PLATFORM_INFO.

  • sevsnphost-rapl-disabled refers to bit 3 of PLATFORM_INFO.

  • sevsnphost-ciphertext-hiding-enabled refers to bit 4 of PLATFORM_INFO.

  • Bit position b greater than 4 of PLATFORM_INFO corresponds to extension -49-b.

The sevsnpvm-policy-debug-allowed flag is redundant with flags-map / is-debug, so either representation is valid. The entirety of the value space is reserved for AMD revisions to the SEV-SNP firmware and corresponding ATTESTATION_REPORT API.

3.1.2.2. AMD SEV-SNP measurements

The measurements in an ATTESTATION_REPORT are grouped into 10 mkeys that can refer to one or more measured values.

The REPORT_DATA is meant for protocol use and not reference measurements.

mkey 0: primary guest measurements

The mval measurement-values-map may contain values for GUEST_SVN, MEASUREMENT, POLICY flags, FAMILY_ID and/or IMAGE_ID.

  • The GUEST_SVN 32-bit unsigned integer may be given a reference value as an svn-type with a tagged-svn or tagged-min-svn encoding around a uint32 in an &(svn: 1): svn-type entry.

  • The MEASUREMENT 384-bit digest may be referenced with a &(digest: 2): [[7, MEASUREMENT]] entry.

  • The POLICY flags may be referenced with a &(flags: 3): flags-map entry following the correspondence defined in Section 3.1.2.1

  • The IMAGE_ID may be referenced with a

    &(version: 0): / version-map / {
  &(version: 0): hex(IMAGE_ID)
}

    where hex(IMAGE_ID) is the 128-bit identifier translated to a hexadecimal string.

  • The FAMILY_ID may be referenced as &(raw-value: 4): 560(FAMILY_ID).

mkey 1: The minimum ABI guest policy

The ATTESTATION_REPORT POLICY's lower 16 bits MAJOR_ABI and MINOR_ABI is expressed as version with semantic versioning scheme that has patch version 0.

/ measurement-values-map / {
  / version: / 0: / version-map / {
    / version: / 0: "1.55.0"
    / version-scheme: / 1: 16384
  }
}

The MAJOR_ABI, MINOR_ABI of the POLICY are not entirely redundant with Verifier policy evaluation against host's (mkey 8) &(version: 0) since the policy may relevant to key derivations.

mkey 2 The VMPL of the report.

The VMPL is expressed as a raw value that makes use of the extended $raw-value-type-choice to use a uint. To refer to VMPL 2, say

/ measurement-values-map / {
  / raw-value: / 4: 2
}

mkey 3: The REPORT_ID.

The REPORT_ID is expressed as a &(raw-value: 4): tagged-bytes.

mkey 4: The REPORT_ID_MA.

The REPORT_ID_MA is expressed as a &(raw-value: 4): tagged-bytes.

mkey 5: The ID_KEY_DIGEST.

The ID_KEY_DIGEST is expressed as a &(raw-value: 4): tagged-bytes.

mkey 6: The AUTHOR_KEY_DIGEST.

The AUTHOR_KEY_DIGEST is expressed as a &(raw-value: 4): tagged-bytes.

mkey 7: The REPORTED_TCB host measurement.

The REPORTED_TCB is interpreted as a little-endian 64-bit unsigned integer and expressed as an &(svn: 1): svn-type .and svn64-type, where

svn64-type = tagged-svn64 / tagged-min-svn64
tagged-svn64 = #6.552(uint64)
tagged-min-svn64 = #6.553(uint64)

mkey 8: The current host measurements

The CURRENT_MAJOR, CURRENT_MINOR, and CURRENT_BUILD fields are expressed as a version with semantic version scheme. The version text is the three numbers in decimal form, separated by '.' (U+002E), in major, minor, build order.

The HOSTDATA field is expressed as a raw value. The PLATFORM_INFO are expressed with a flags measurement with the specified flag extensions. For example,

/ measurement-values-map / {
  / version: / 0: / version-map / {
    / version: / 0: "1.55.20"
    / version-scheme / 1: 16384
  }
  / flags: / 3: / flags-map / {
    -49: true
    -52: true
  }
  / raw-value: / 4: 560(
    h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
    h'ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100'
  )
}

  • 0x9: The COMMITTED host measurements for COMMITTED_BUILD, CURRENT_MAJOR, CURRENT_MINOR, and COMMITTED_TCB.

The COMMITTED_MAJOR, COMMITTED_MINOR, and COMMITTED_BUILD fields are expressed as a version with semantic version scheme. The version text is the three numbers in decimal form, separated by '.' (U+002E), in major, minor, build order.

The COMMITTED_TCB is interpreted as a little-endian 64-bit unsigned integer and expressed as an &(svn: 1): svn-type .and svn64-type. For example, suppose the committed TCB has microcode SVN 209, SNP firmware version 22, TEE version 0, and bootloader version 3

/ measurement-values-map / {
  / version: / 0: / version-map / {
    / version: / 0: "1.55.20"
    / version-scheme: / 16384
  }
  / svn: / 1: 552(0xd116000000000003)
}

  • 0xa: The LAUNCH_TCB host measurement.

The LAUNCH_TCB is interpreted as a little-endian 64-bit unsigned integer and expressed as an &(svn: 1): svn-type .and svn64-type.

3.1.3. AMD SEV-SNP Evidence Translation

The ATTESTATION_REPORT Evidence is converted into a CoRIM internal representation ECT for the ae relation using the rules in this section.

3.1.3.1. environment

If SIGNING_KEY is 0

  • The environment-map / class / class-id field SHALL be set to 37(h'd05e6d1b9f464ae2a610ce3e6ee7e153').

  • The environment-map / instance field

    • MAY be 560(CHIP_ID) only if MASK_CHIP_KEY is 0, or

    • MAY be 560(hwid) where hwid is from the VCEK certificate extension value of 1.3.6.1.4.1.3704.1.4.

If SIGNING_KEY is 1

  • The environment-map / class / class-id field SHALL be set to 37(h'89a7a1f0e7044faaacbd81c86df8a961').

  • The environment-map / instance field SHALL be 560(CSP_ID).

3.1.3.2. element-list

Different fields of the attestation report correspond to different element-ids that correspond to their mkey value of a CoMID.

The translation makes use of the following metafunctions:

  • The function hex(bstr) represents the hexadecimal string encoding of a byte string.

  • The function dec(b) represents a byte in its decimal string rendering.

Juxtaposition of expressions with string literals is interpreted with string concatenation.

Note: A value of 0 is not treated the same as unset given the semantics for matching flags-map.

element-id: 0, the guest data element-claims

The &(version: 0) codepoint MAY be unset if the report does not contain ID block data, otherwise the &(version: 0) codepoint SHALL be set to

/ version-map / {
  / version: / 0: hex(IMAGE_ID)
}

The &(svn: 1) codepoint MAY be unset if the report does not contain ID block data, otherwise the &(svn: 1) codepoint SHALL be set to 552(leuint(GUEST_SVN)).

The &(digests: 2) codepoint SHALL be set to [[7, MEASUREMENT]]. The algorithm assignment is from [IANA.named-information] for SHA384.

The &(flags: 3) codepoint SHALL be set to a flags-map with the following construction:

  • is-confidentiality-protected MAY be set to true.

  • is-integrity-protected MAY be set to true.

  • is-replay-protected MAY be set to true.

  • is-debug SHALL be set to the truth value of bit 19 of POLICY.

  • The extensions for POLICY are assigned their truth values following the correspondence in Section 3.1.2.1.

The $(raw-value: 4) codepoint MAY be unset if the report does not contain ID block data, otherwise the &(raw-value: 4) codepoint SHALL be set to 560(FAMILY_ID).

element-id: 1, guest policy minimum firmware element-claims

The &(version: 0) SHALL be set to

/ version-map / {
  / version: /: dec(POLICY[15:8]) '.' dec(POLICY[7:0]) '.0'
  / version-scheme: / 16384
}

element-id: 2, the report privilege level element-claims

The &(raw-value: 5) codepoint SHALL be set to VMPL as a uint.

element-id: 3, the per-launch REPORT_ID element-claims

The &(raw-value: 5) codepoint SHALL be set to 560(REPORT_ID).

element-id: 4, the migration agent–assigned REPORT_ID_MA element-claims

The &(raw-value: 5) codepoint SHALL be set to 560(REPORT_ID_MA) if nonzero.

element-id: 5, the ID block–signing key digest ID_KEY_DIGEST element-claims

The &(raw-value: 5) codepoint SHALL be set to 560(ID_KEY_DIGEST) if nonzero.

element-id: 6, the ID block–signing key's certifying key digest AUTHOR_KEY_DIGEST element-claims

The &(raw-value: 5) codepoint SHALL be set to 560(AUTHOR_KEY_DIGEST) if nonzero.

element-id: 7, the REPORTED_TCB element-claims

The &(svn: 1) codepoint SHALL be set to 552(reported_tcb) where reported_tcb is REPORTED_TCB translated to uint from its little-endian representation.

element-id: 8, the current host info element-claims

The &(version: 0) codepoint SHALL be set to

/ version-map / {
  / version: 0 / vstr
  / version-scheme: / 1: 16384
}

The version string vstr is constructed as dec(CURRENT_MAJOR) '.' dec(CURRENT_MINOR) '.' dec(CURRENT_BUILD).

The &(flags: 3) / flags-map extensions for PLATFORM_INFO SHALL be assign their truth values following the correspondence is Section 3.1.2.1.

The &(raw-value: 5) codepoint SHALL be set to 560(HOSTDATA) and MAY be omitted if all zeros.

element-id: 9, the committed host info element-claims

The &(version: 0) codepoint SHALL be set to

/ version-map / {
  / version: 0 / vstr
  / version-scheme: / 1: 16384
}

The version string vstr is constructed as dec(COMMITTED_MAJOR) '.' dec(COMMITTED_MINOR) '.' dec(COMMITTED_BUILD).

The &(svn: 1) codepoint SHALL be set to 552(commited_tcb) where committed_tcb is COMMITTED_TCB translated to a uint from its little-endian representation.

element-id: 10, the TCB at launch element-claims

The &(svn: 1) codepoint SHALL be set to 552(launch_tcb) where launch_tcb is LAUNCH_TCB translated to a uint from its little-endian representation.

3.1.3.3. authority

The authority SHALL be set to an array of the tagged-pkix-asn1der-cert-type forms of the VEK certificate for the ATTESTATION_REPORT signing key, the intermediate key, and the AMD root key for the product line.

The Verifier MAY add additional encodings of these keys.

3.1.3.4. cmtype

The cmtype SHALL be evidence: 2.

3.1.3.5. profile

The profile SHALL be set to this profile's identifier, 32("http://amd.com/please-permalink-me")

3.1.3.6. Optional: ID block as reference value

If an ID block is provided at VM launch, it is authenticated by an ID key. The ID block authentication is checked by the AMD-SP firmware. The firmware will only launch the VM if the authenticated policy matches. The firmware indicates that the authentication passed by populating fields of the attestation report to bind the evidence to the authentication key(s) ID_KEY_DIGEST and/or AUTHOR_KEY_DIGEST. The ID block authentication as reference value SHALL NOT be retained by the Verifier to apply to another appraisal session. The reference value qualification is meant to be considered valid only for the duration of the appraisal session.

The Verifier MAY allocate an rv for an addition ECT to represent the authentication at SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH.

  • The environment SHALL be equal to the environment of the evidence ECT.

  • The element-list SHALL contain two element-map entries

    • The first element-map SHALL set element-id to 0 and the element-claims to a copy of the evidence claims for element-id: 0.

    • The second element-map SHALL set element-id to 1 and the element-claims to a copy of the evidence claims for element-id: 1.

  • The authority SHALL be an array containing 32780(ID_KEY_DIGEST) and 32780(AUTHOR_KEY_DIGEST) if nonzero. The Verifier MAY add more encodings of the same keys.

  • The cmtype SHALL be set to reference-values: 0

  • The profile SHALL be set to this profile's identifier, 32("http://amd.com/please-permalink-me").

4. TCG considerations

The Trusted Computing Group has standardized the PCClient Platform Firmware Profile to specify expected TPM event log processing. Since AMD SEV-SNP launch measurements are of virtual firmware, they can supplement the EV_POST_CODE2 event measured into PCR0 for the EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2 since the bits of the firmware are more specific than embedded firmware version strings.

5. IANA Considerations

5.1. New CBOR Tags

IANA is requested to allocate the following tags in the "CBOR Tags" registry [IANA.cbor-tags].

Table 1: Added CBOR tags
Tag Data Item Semantics Reference
32780 bytes A digest of an AMD public key format. RFCthis

5.2. New media types

5.2.1. application/vnd.amd.sev.snp.attestation-report

An octet-stream that is expected to be interpreted as an AMD SEV-SNP ATTESTATION_REPORT.

5.2.2. application/vnd.amd.ghcb.guid-table

An octet-stream that follows the [GHCB]'s GUID table ABI, which is the same as the [SVSM] service manifest ABI, recounted here. A GUID table is a header followed by an octet-stream body. The header is a sequence of entries described in Table 2 terminated by an all zero entry. After the all zero entry are the bytes that the header entries index into.

Table 2: guid_table_entry type description
Type Name Description
UUID GUID An [RFC4122] byte format UUID
LE_UINT32 Offset An offset into the the GUID table
LE_UINT32 Length A byte length of the span

An LE_UINT32 is a 4 byte octet-stream that represents a nonnegative integer in little-endian order.

Note that an offset is from the start of the octet-stream, and not from the start of the octets following the zero entry of the header. A header entry is valid if its Offset+Length is less than or equal to the size of the entire GUID table.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-rats-corim]
Birkholz, H., Fossati, T., Deshpande, Y., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Concise Reference Integrity Manifest", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-corim-05, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-corim-05>.
[IANA.cbor-tags]
IANA, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cbor-tags>.
[IANA.named-information]
IANA, "Named Information", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/named-information>.
[RFC4122]
Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4122>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8610]
Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.
[RFC9334]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.

6.2. Informative References

[GHCB]
Advanced Micro Devices Inc., "SEV-ES Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization", Revision 2.03 , , <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/epyc-technical-docs/specifications/56421.pdf>.
[SEV-SNP.API]
Advanced Micro Devices Inc., "SEV Secure Nested Paging Firmware ABI Specification", Revision 1.55 , , <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/epyc-technical-docs/specifications/56860.pdf>.
[SVSM]
Advanced Micro Devices Inc., "Secure VM Services Module", Revision 1.00 , , <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/epyc-technical-docs/specifications/58019.pdf>.
[VCEK]
Advanced Micro Devices Inc., "Versioned Chip Endorsement Key (VCEK) Certificate and KDS Interface Specification", Revision 0.51 , , <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/epyc-technical-docs/specifications/57230.pdf>.
[VLEK]
Advanced Micro Devices Inc., "Versioned Loaded Endorsement Key (VLEK) Certificate Definition", Revision 0.10 , , <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/epyc-technical-docs/user-guides/58369-010-versioned-loaded-endorsement-key-certificate-definition.pdf>.

Appendix A. CoRIM Extensions CDDL 

$crypto-key-type-choice /= #6.32780(bytes .size 48)

digest = [
  alg: (int / text),
  val: bytes
]

non-empty<M> = (M) .and ({ + any => any })

$$flags-map-extension //= &(
  sevsnpvm-policy-smt-allowed: -1,
  sevsnpvm-policy-migration-agent-allowed: -2,
  sevsnpvm-policy-debug-allowed: -3,
  sevsnpvm-policy-single-socket-only: -4,
  sevsnpvm-policy-cxl-allowed: -5,
  sevsnpvm-policy-mem-aes-256-xts-required: -6,
  sevsnpvm-policy-rapl-must-be-disabled: -7,
  sevsnpvm-policy-ciphertext-hiding-must-be-enabled: -8,
  sevsnpvm-policy-reserved: -47..-9,
)

$version-scheme /= &(sevsnpvm-familyimageid-hex: -1)

$raw-value-type-choice /= uint

$$flags-map-extension //= &(
  sevsnphost-smt-enabled: -49,
  sevsnphost-tsme-enabled: -50,
  sevsnphost-ecc-mem-reported-enabled:-51,
  sevsnphost-rapl-disabled: -52,
  sevsnphost-ciphertext-hiding-enabled: -53
  sevsnphost-reserved: -112..-49
)

svn-type = uint
svn = svn-type
min-svn = svn-type
tagged-svn = #6.552(svn)
tagged-min-svn = #6.553(min-svn)
svn-type-choice = tagged-svn / tagged-min-svn

svn64-type = tagged-svn64 / tagged-min-svn64
tagged-svn64 = #6.552(uint64)
tagged-min-svn64 = #6.553(uint64)

uint16 = 0..65535

uint32 = 0..4294967295

uint64 = 0..18446744073709551615

Contributors

Yogesh Deshpande
arm

Yogesh Deshpande contributed to the data model by providing advice about CoRIM founding principles.

Author's Address

Dionna Glaze
Google LLC